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as was stated in the Caplan case, because the father's personal assets
cannot be reached to satisfy the judgment.
If the courts are going to adhere to the doctrine of parental im-
munity, it should be applied in all situations in which liability on the
father is imposed, indirectly as well as directly. The father's ultimate
liability should not be ignored in order to allow recovery in the first
instance.
GARNrT L. PAriTrSN, 11
ATTORNEY'S PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AS WITHIN
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The policy of granting a privilege to communications made by a
client to his attorney is one of the venerable doctrines of Anglo-
American law. The privilege originated during the reign of Elizabeth
I in recognition of the honor and dignity of the attorney's profession.'
By the latter part of the eighteenth century, however, the purpose of
the privilege had been altered so as to become a guarantee of freedom
from apprehension and anxiety on the part of clients as they sought
legal advice.2 This is essentially the basis of the privilege today. It en-
courages complete divulgence to the attorney of facts known by the
client in order that the attorney may best be able to prepare his cli-
ent's case.
3
The doctrine has been the subject of some statutory regulation.
4
Except for minor changes the various statutes are declaratory of the
common law.- Generally speaking, the privilege extends to communi-
"Waldron v. Ward, Style 449, 82 Eng. Rep. 853 (K.B. 1654); Dennis v. Codring-
ton, Cary 1oo, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (Ch. 1580); Kelway v. Keiway, Cary 88, 21 Eng.
Rep. 47 (Ch. 158o) . See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 (3d ed. i91o) for a full discus-
sion of this matter.
2Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 My. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1933).
3 Pritchard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. ig5o); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 195o ) , Stone v. Minter, i11 Ga. 45, 36
S.E. 321 (igoo); State v. Johns, 2o9 La. 244, 24 So. 2d 462 (1945); Doherty v. O'Calag-
han, 157 Mass. 9
o , 31 N.E. 726 (1892); State v. Toscano, 13 N.J. 418, loo A.2d 170
(1953); In re Kleman, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E.2d 492 (1936); 8 Wigmore, Evidence §
2291 (3 d ed. 1940).
4ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1714 (Repl. Vol. 1946); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-28o5
(1949); Model Code of Evidence Rule 210 (1942). For a textual discussion of this
point see 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses § 463 (1948); 97 c.J.S. Witnesses § 276 (1957).
-Olsson v. Pierson, 237 Iowa 1342, 25 N.W.2d 357 (1946); Kent Jewelry Corp.
v. Kiefer, 20o2 Misc. 778, 113 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1952); In re Williams' Estate,
179 Misc. 8o 5 , 39 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Surr. Ct. i9.12); State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash. 2d
799, 259 P.2d 845 (1953)-
CASE COMMENTS
cations made by a client to his attorney, who has been retained and
is acting in his professional capacity. The privilege applies to com-
munications that concern the subject matter of the attorney's em-
ployment.6
The many ramifications of the privilege give rise to difficult and
often complex questions. Two of these questions were posed in the
case of Taylor v. Sheldon,7 a will contest from Ohio.
The contestants offered testimony of an attorney as to the mental
competency of the testator. The attorney had been summoned by the
testator to draw the will but after the initial conference he with-
drew without doing so. During the course of the trial, the contestants
called the attorney as a witness to testify as to the competency of the
testator. The trial court, upon objection by the proponents of the will,
refused to allow the attorney to testify as to such matter on the
ground that the testimony concerned a privileged communication.
The trial court directed a verdict validating the will.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Ohio found that no attor-
ney-client relationship existed and that irrespective of that relation-
ship, an attorney is competent to testify as to a client's mental con-
dition where such knowledge would be apparent to any casual ob-
server.
The case went to the Ohio Supreme Court where a majority of
the court reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that communi-
cations made to an attorney by a prospective client constitute privi-
leged communications inasmuch as a tentative attorney-client rela-
tionship exists. Furthermore, the court pointed out that this privilege
covers observations by an attorney of a client's mental condition when
such knowledge is acquired by the attorney during the attorney-client
relationship.
The dissenting judge felt that the Ohio law should not be so strict-
ly interpreted and, like the Court of Appeals, would not include with-
in the privilege knowledge gained incidentally by the attorney from
his client.
OModern Woodmen v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1942); Snow v. Gould,
74 Me. 540 (1883); Ex parte Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E.2d 388 '(1943); Jackson
v. State, 155 Tenn. 371, 293 S.W. 539 (1927); Collins v. Hoffman, 62 Wash. 278, 113
Pac. 625 (191 ').
The privilege does not exist where an attorney is consulted with reference to
the commission of a future crime or tort. Furthermore, the privilege does not exist
where it can be said that the client has waived it. Inasmuch as the rule of privileged
communications does not readily lend itself to a brief summation, the above is
necessarily oversimplified. For a more complete discussion see 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses
§§ 483, 484 (1948); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 276, 280 (1957)-
7172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961).
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The first question raised in Taylor v. Sheldon is whether the rule of
privileged communications between attorney and client applies where
the only business ever transacted between the parties is a conference
preliminary to actual employment. The relation of attorney and client
is usually thought of as arising by contract, either express or implied,
and so requires a valid offer and acceptance.8
Clearly, no contractual arrangement existed between the prospec-
tive attorney and prospective client in the Taylor case.9 However, the
Supreme Court pointed out that in some instances the purpose of the
privilege would be defeated by excluding from its protection a pre-
liminary conference between an attorney and client with a view to-
wards future employment. Obviously, an attorney will ordinarily want
to know certain facts in order to decide whether to accept or reject
employment. Without the protection of the rule at this time, clients
would not be able to reveal freely and completely all pertinent facts
to attorneys. "To hold otherwise would so weaken the rule as to make
it useless in many instances and, therefore, would discourage a per-
son from seeking the services of an attorney which he might sorely
need."' 0
The second and more difficult problem presented by the Taylor
case is whether the rule of privileged communications extends to all
matters observed by the attorney in his relationship with the client.
More particularly, the question in this case was whether an attorney
could testify as to the mental condition of the testator, based upon the
attorney's general observations. made during his only conference with
the prospective client. 1"
The majority opinion reasoned that although the knowledge in
question was such as might have been available to any layman observ-
ing the decedent, the attorney obtained this knowledge by virtue of
sKeir v. State, 152 Fla. 389, ii So. 2d 886, 888 (1943); Moyers v. Fogarty, 140
Iowa 7o, 119 N.W. 159, 165 (19o9); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 23o4 (3d ed. 194o).
0172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892, 893 (1961).
10173 N.E.2d at 895. See United States v. Funk, 84 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Ky. 1949);
State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722 (1894); Sheehan v. Allen, 67
Kan. 712, 74 Pac. 245 (19o3); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2304 (3 d ed. 1940).
"The Ohio Revised Code, which appears to be declaratory of the common law
rule (see text supra at notes 4-6) as to privileged communications between attorney
and client provides as follows:
"The following persons shall not testify in certain respects: (A) An
attorney, concerning a communication made to him by his client in that
relation or his advice to his client... but the attorney ... may testify by
express consent of the client.., and if the client ... voluntarily testifies,
the attorney ... may be compelled to testify on the same subject...." Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.02 (Baldwin 1958).
CASE COMMENTS
his professional relationship with the decedent. The court concluded
that such knowledge is privileged. 12 Furthermore, the court pointed
out that the knowledge possessed by the attorney was related to the
subject matter of the contemplated employment.
"This determination of competency is a necessary and essential
element of the preparation of a will, is directly related to the
services for which the attorney is employed and is, therefore, a
definite part of the privileged communications made to the at-
torney."
13
The most questionable feature of the Taylor decision is that it im-
ports that all knowledge gained by an attorney while acting in his pro-
fessional capacity might be privileged simply because of the attorney-
client relationship.' 4 It is well settled that the mere relationship of
attorney and client is not enough to bring a communication within the
rule of privileged communications.' 5
Inasmuch as the Taylor court stated that mental competency
was material to the subject matter of employment-the drafting of a
will-the further question of significance of materiality is raised.
Courts do not always use consistent language in answering the
question of whether or not the privilege is limited in some way to com-
munications material to the subject matter of the attorney's employ-
ment. They tend to state that communications between an attorney and
client are privileged only when they concern the subject matter of the
employment. It is usually noted that where a client knowingly departs
from the professional relationship and speaks of irrelevant matters
the communications are not privileged. However, a problem arises
with this reasoning where a client is unable to distinguish between
what is relevant and irrelevant. If a materiality test is applied in this
1-The Ohio Supreme Court first considered whether or not the situation pre-
qented by the Tayor case fell within either of the exceptions in the Ohio Statutes.
In Knepper v. Knepper, 103 Ohio St. 529, 134 N.E. 476 (ig2), the attorney
who had drawn a will and acted as a subscribing witness was permitted to testify as
a subscribing witness. In having his attorney act as a subscribing witness to his
will, a testator expressly consents that the attorney may testify fully as to factors af-
fecting the validity of the will.
The doctrine of waiver does not fit the Taylor situation since there was no
express consent by the client to the attorney's testimony, nor testimony by the
client from which to imply consent.
is172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892, 897 (1961).
4173 N.E.2d at 896, 897.
'5See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass.
195o); In re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 1o5 A.2d 395, 402 (1954); Emley v. Selepchak, 76
Ohio App. 257, 63 N.E.2d 919, 921 (1945); Heiselmann v. Franks, 48 Ohio App. 536,
194 N.E. 604 (1934); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2291 (3d ed. 194o); See also the dissent
in Taylor v. Sheldon, 172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892, 898 (1961).
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situation, the very purpose of the doctrine might well be defeated.
In this situation courts do not as a general rule require that communi-
cations bear a material relation to the attorney's employment.16
In discussing this matter in his treatise on Evidence, Professor
Wigmore suggests an "intent" limitation on the privilege:
"[T]hose data which would have come to the attorney's notice
in any event, by mere observation, without any action on the
client's part-such as tile color of his hat or the pattern of his
shoe-and those data which become known by such acts as the
client would ordinarily have done in any event, without any
purpose of communicating them to the attorney as his ad-
viser.., are not any part of the communication of the client....
On the other hand, almost any act, done by the client in the
sight of the attorney... may conceivably be done by the client
as the subject of a communication, and the only question will
be whether, in the circumstances of the case, it was intended to
be done as such.""7
Under the intent test suggested by Professor Wigmore, a com-
munication might be material and not privileged. Likewise, a com-
munication may be immaterial to the subject matter of the employ-
ment and still privileged. This is not to say that an express request for
secrecy is necessary for the privilege to apply. The circumstances of
each case must be considered in order to determine if intended con-
fidentiality may be implied therefrom. Certainly materiality would be
one of the prime circumstances to be considered. The important point
is that materiality and intent are not synonymous in this context. The
"intent" test looks to the character of the communication rather
than its relevancy. Though courts often seem to use "materiality"
and "intent" interchangeably in writing opinions, it is suggested
that in most of these instances the test used is essentially an intent test,
the real consideration being whether an element of confidentiality
existed.1'
16in re Bathwick's Will, 241 Mich, 156, 216 N.W. 420 (1927); Bussen v. Del
Commune,239 Mo. App. 859, 199 S.W.2d 13 (1947); In re Williams' Estate, 179 Misc.
8o5, 39 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Surr. Ct. 1942). For a full discussion of this point see 8
N.Y.S.2d 741 (Surr. Ct. 1942). For a full discussion of this point see 8 Wigmore,
Evidence § 231o (3d ed. 194o).
1'8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2306 (3 d ed. 1940). See Hawley v. Hawley, 114 F.2d 745,
749 (D.C. Cir. i94o); Jackson v. Pillsbury, 380 Ill. 554, 44 N.E.2d 537, 547 (1942);
Debolt v. Blackburn, 328 Ill. 420, 159 N.E. 790, 792 (1928); Wicks v. Dean, 1o3 Ky.
69, 44 S.W. 397 (1898); Canty v. Halpin, 294 Mo. 96, 242 S.W. 94, 96 (1922).
'1 See Hawley v. Hawley, 114 F.2d 745, 749 (D.C. Cir. 194o); Oliver v. Warren,
16 Cal. App. 164, 16 Pac. 312 (Dist. Ct. App. 1911); O'Brien v. Spalding, 102 Ga.
490, 31 S.E. 100 (1897).
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It might well be argued that in the Taylor situation an "intent"
test gives the same result. A testator quite likely intends that every-
thing connected with the substance of his will should remain confi-
dential. Why then should not general observations of a client's be-
havior by an attorney in conjunction with the drawing of a will be
privileged? The answer is most clearly and forcefully stated by Profes-
sor Wigmore.
"But the answer is that such utterances were obviously not con-
fidentially made with reference to the secrecy of the fact of in-
sanity or undue influence, for the testator of course did not be-
lieve those facts to exist and therefore could not possibly be
said to have communicated them."'u
The privilege exists to secure freedom of communication between
attorneys and their clients. The rule is thought essential to the ad-
ministration of justice. Nevertheless the privilege runs counter to the
fundamental theory of our judicial system that the fullest disclosure
will lead to justice.2 0 It is an obstacle to arriving at the truth and so
the privilege ought to be narrowly construed in accord with its ob-
ject.2 t It is submitted that it is quite unlikely that a prospective client
would hesitate in seeking legal advice out of fear that an attorney
might make adverse observations concerning his mental condition
and later reveal them.
It is suggested that inasmuch as the Taylor court does not appear
to have been bound by statute or precedent, it should have adopted
a more restrictive test as to communications falling within the at-
torney-client privilege. Under the Taylor test the privilege is extended
beyond its object in that its application depends upon the materiality
or relevancy of a fact or statement to the subject matter of employ-
ment. The best test would seem to be whether the communication is
'18 Wiginore, Evidence § 2314 (3d ed. 1940).
"OIt is also suggested that the privilege tends to increase litigation. Suppose Mr.
X, a dishonest claimant, is informed by his attorney after the latter has heard all
the fact, that his claim is not a valid one. Nevertheless, Mr. X as a dishonest claim-
ant will desire the attorney to help him win his csae. If the attorney refuses, X
is likely to seek aid from a less scrupulous attorney. Without the protection of the
privilege, the first attorney could reveal the facts defeating X's claim. If X is
an honest claimant, the existence of the privilege would be of little significance
in this situation, for Mr. X would not wish to litigate an invalid claim and would
make no attempt to conceal pertinent facts.
21Hawley v. Hawley, 114 F.2d 745, 749 (D.C. Cir. 194o); In re Selser, 15 N.J.
393, 1o5 A.-2d 395, 401 ('954); 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses § 487 (1948); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses
§ 276 (1957); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2291 (3d ed. 1946) .
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-8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2310 (3 d ed. 1940). See United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 195o); Hawley v. Hawley, 114 F.2d 745, 749
(D.C. Cir. 1940); Jackson v. Pillsbury, 38o IIi. 554, 44 N.E.2d 537, 547 (1942); House
v. House, 61 Mich. 69, 27 N.W. 858 (1886); Hazlett v. Bryant, sii Tenn. 251, 241
S.W.2d 121, 124 (1951). See O'Brien v. Spalding, 102 Ga. 490, 31 S.E. 100, 102 (1897);
Sheehan v. Allen, 67 Kan. 712, 74 Pac. 245, 247 (19o3); Debolt v. Blackburn, 328
Ill. 420, 159 N.E. 790, 792 (1928); Canty v. Halpin, 294 Mo. 96, 242 S.W. 94 (1922).
